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MELTING INTO AIR? DOWNSIZING, JOB STABILITY, AND
THE FUTURE OF WORK
SANFORD M. JACOBY*
INTRODUCTION
Academics and journalists tell us that we are currently witnessing
a historic event: the demise of career-type jobs. Richard Sennett, the
sociologist, argues eloquently that the surge in corporate downsizing
is the signal occurrence of our postmodern age, with ramifications far
beyond the labor market.' As careers condense, so do our time
horizons and relationships. What Sennett calls "no long term" is a
pervasive force eroding our moral strength. "No long term," he says,
"disorients action over the long term, loosens bonds of trust and
commitment, and divorces will from behavior."2
Recent layoffs at ARCO, Heinz, Pillsbury, and other companies
refute the claim that the downsizing phenomenon is spent. The latest
figures from Challenger, Gray & Christmas show that workforce
reduction announcements presently are at the same level as during
the early 1990s recession. And data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics on actual, as opposed to intended, layoffs show that the
number of workers affected by mass layoffs in fall 1998 rose above
levels reached a year earlier.3 On the other hand, the current
unemployment rate is at its lowest level in two decades. Thus, we
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1. RICHARD SENNETr, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 31 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Job Cut Announcements in 1998 Far Outpacing 1997, Challenger Reports, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 235, Dec. 8, 1998, at A-7; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Mass Layoffs
in October 1998, Report No. 99-01.
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have the paradox of rapid job creation amidst continuing job
destruction.
It is not surprising, then, that despite the stock market rise and
low unemployment, many Americans remain anxious about job
security. The share of employees who say they are frequently
concerned about layoffs has risen from 12% in 1981 to 37% in 1999. 4
Politicians are adept at tapping into these sentiments, as in the 1996
presidential campaign, when Patrick Buchanan excoriated executives
for taking huge salaries while laying off thousands of workers.5
President Clinton responded predictably: he organized a conference
and invited employers to the White House to discuss corporate ethics
and responsibilities. 6
The notion that corporations have responsibilities to employees
is hardly a new or radical idea. Its roots lie deep in the American
past-dating back a century or more-when companies first began
systematically to provide for their employees' welfare. The move-
ment was known as "welfare work" or "welfare capitalism." It was
not unique to the United States, but its popularity in this country was
uniquely American. Understanding the history of welfare capitalism
is essential to fathoming what is happening in today's labor market.
Welfare capitalism shaped our nation's risk-sharing insti-tutions-the
same institutions whose future is being questioned by Sennett and
others.
Yet institutional arrangements have changed much less than
Sennett's "no long term" would suggest. Put bluntly, the welfare
capitalist approach remains in place. Career-type employment prac-
tices-an amalgam that economists term "internal labor markets"-
are still the norm in the labor market, and employers continue to
shoulder a variety of risks for employees. None of this is to deny the
labor-market turbulence of the past fifteen years. The mixture of
market and organizational principles that structure the employment
relationship now gives more weight to market factors, especially in
managerial positions.
4. See Susan Mclnerney, Greenspan Says Job Insecurity Still High; Data Show More
Dissatisfaction with Pay, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, Feb. 17, 1999, at AA-1. The share of
workers worried about losing their jobs is down from what it was in 1997-from 44% to 37%.
See id.
5. See Karen Pennar, Ten Years of Downsizing and Widening Income Inequality Have
Taken an Enormous Social Toll. U.S. Workers Are Losing Faith in Their Ability to Prosper,
Bus. WK., Mar. 11, 1996, at 50, 50.
6. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Prods Executives to "Do the Right Thing," N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1996, at D1.
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There also has been a change in risk sharing, with employers
transferring more of the burden to employees. But these are changes
of degree, not of kind. They do not constitute a phase shift but rather
a reallocation of responsibilities within a stable institutional structure.
In what follows, I will discuss that structure's origins, document the
extent of change in recent years, and analyze the prospects for
welfare capitalism's future.
I. ORIGINS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM
American welfare capitalism began in the nineteenth century,
when the population started moving in large numbers from rural to
urban areas. This transformation forced people to seek new ways of
dealing with the uncertainties of life. City-dwelling workers could no
longer rely on homegrown food to get them through a spell of
joblessness. The elderly, who were an important part of rural family
life, found that industrial corporations were reluctant to employ
them. Young unmarried women began to work outside the home,
raising parental concern for their morals. Meanwhile, dangerous
factories and crowded cities brought on occupational injuries and
other health problems.
One response to these new forms of risk was market
individualism: workers saved as best they could while taking fierce
pride in the independence that came from having a well-rounded set
of skills. Another strategy was to form mutual benefit associations to
provide savings funds, health plans, and burial benefits. Some of
these associations grew into insurance companies; others grew into
trade unions. An alternative to individualism and mutualism was
government, which sought to indemnify risk through protective
legislation or to redistribute risk via social insurance programs. The
idea here was the same as the European welfare state-that is, to
pool risks by providing all citizens with unemployment, sickness, and
old-age security. A fourth option was to have corporations reduce
risk or protect their employees against it. This option, essentially, was
welfare capitalism. To Americans concerned about the labor
question of the early twentieth century, welfare capitalism offered a
distinctive answer: the business corporation, rather than government
or trade unions, would be the source of security and stability in
modern society.7
7. See Sanford Jacoby, Risk and the Labor Market: Societal Past As Economic Prologue,
in SOURCEBOOK ON LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCrURES AND PROCESSES (Ivar Berg &
20001
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, welfare capitalism
could be found throughout the industrialized world, but it was
especially popular in the United States. American employers favored
welfare capitalism because they thought it would inhibit the growth of
unions and government. And they saw it as an efficient alternative to
market individualism-training would be cheaper and productivity
higher if employees spent their work lives with a single firm instead of
seeking their fortunes on the open market. There was also a moral
impulse behind welfare capitalism: self-made business owners felt a
sense of stewardship to their employees. In short, welfare capitalism
was a good fit for a distinctive American environment comprised of
large firms, weak unions, and small government.
Welfare capitalism was an influential movement in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was embraced by
employers as well as by intellectuals, social reformers, and political
leaders. All shared the belief that industrial unrest and other
problems could best be alleviated by this distinctively American
approach: private, not governmental; managerial, not laborist. To put
these ideas into practice, employers cleaned up their factories,
constructed elaborate recreational facilities, launched "company"
unions, and even built housing for their employees. They turned
casual jobs into more stable positions, offering pensions and other
benefits. By the 1920s, welfare capitalism reached millions of workers
at thousands of firms. It was an impressive if imperfect edifice, a
system whose notions of order, community, and paternal
responsibility recalled the preindustrial household economy. The
firms pursuing welfare capitalism were, in effect, modern manors.8
But the edifice crumbled during the Great Depression.
Companies cut wages, instituted massive layoffs, and discontinued
most of their welfare programs. Economist William Leiserson, who
earlier had been dazzled by welfare capitalism, wrote pessimistically
in 1933 that the Great Depression had "undone fifteen years or so of
good personnel work."9 In 1933, workers searched for alternatives to
safeguard their security. They voted for the Democratic party,
Arne Kalleberg eds., forthcoming).
8. See SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE THE
NEW DEAL 4-5 (1997).
9. Dr. William M. Leiserson, Personnel Problems Raised by the Present Economic Crisis,
22 MGMT. REV. 114, 114 (1933). See generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING
BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 222 (1985).
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supported the New Deal, and enthusiastically joined unions.
Essentially what the new unions achieved was the extension,
codification, and joint administration of welfare capitalist initiatives.
Welfare capitalism-at least the nonunion version of it-appeared to
be dead and gone.
Or was it? In fact, welfare capitalism did not die in the 1930s but
instead went underground-out of the public eye and beyond
academic scrutiny. There it began to reshape itself. Without doubt,
welfare capitalism had to change if it was to survive what was
becoming a hostile climate in which company unions were unlawful,
collective bargaining was public policy, and the new American
welfare state promised to shield workers from the uncertainties of
industrial life.
In response to these challenges, welfare capitalism gradually was
modernized by a group of firms that had been spared unionization
and the ravages of the Great Depression. In my recent book, Modern
Manors, I focus on three such companies-Kodak, Sears Roebuck,
and Thompson Products (today TRW). These companies were
exceptions to the "rise and fall" story of welfare capitalism; each one
made major contributions to welfare capitalism's modernization
between the 1930s and 1960s, the period when labor and government
activism were at a peak in the United States.
In their attempts to build "modern manors," these companies
retained many elements of earlier welfare capitalism. Kodak, Sears,
and Thompson provided generous benefit plans to their employees,
though these plans were redesigned as supplements to Social Security
and other public programs. At the same time, each company still
asserted that it was a corporate community whose cohesion stood in
opposition to the occupational and industrial solidarity of the labor
movement. But employers had to be more careful to make sure that
their attempts to build an industrial community did not violate the
new labor laws, such as the Wagner Act.
Historians have written a great deal about welfare capitalism
during the first three decades of this century, and there is an
abundance of articles about today's progressive employers. But we
know very little about welfare capitalism during the period from the
1930s to the 1960s. Explanations for this gap are not hard to find.
Industrial relations experts were preoccupied during the 1940s and
20001
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1950s with forging a new labor relations system based on collective
bargaining. These experts thought collective bargaining would
protect individuals from the political power of business and from the
psychological demands of bureaucratic work organizations. They saw
unions as a way to preserve independence in the modern world.
(That is the same message they brought to Japan during the postwar
occupation.) But because these experts gave the labor movement
such an important historical function, they viewed nonunion
companies as socially retrograde and undeserving of scrutiny.
One result of this blind spot was the erroneous impression that
organized labor had achieved greater stability and acceptability than
actually was the case. During the 1930s and 1940s, many American
workers joined unions. But it was also the case that many workers
did not join unions. At its peak after the Second World War, the
labor movement represented less than one-third of nonagricultural
workers, and its strength was concentrated in only a few regions and
sectors. 10  Just three sectors-construction, manufacturing, and
regulated transport and energy utilities-accounted for more than
80% of organized labor at its peak. Although much has been written
about recent union losses in representation elections, this trend
actually started long ago, during the Second World War."
Back in the 1940s, even the automotive industry-a hotbed of
unionism-was filled with anti-union individualists, many of them
skilled workers who boasted of their superior experience, dedication,
and loyalty. Then there were groups like African American workers,
who were skeptical of both unions and management but willing to
give management the benefit of the doubt so long as it kept its
promises, especially about employment security, a critical issue for
workers who lived through the Great Depression. 12
As for management, its acceptance of unions after the war has
also been overstated. True, it was possible to find employers like
John Rovensky, a prominent industrialist, who said in 1952 that "[aill
10. See LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE,
FINANCE, DIRECTORY 7-3, app.1 (1985).
11. See Richard N. Block & Benjamin W. Wolkinson, Delay in the Union Election
Campaign Revisited: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, in 3 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS 43, 53 (David B. Lipsky & David Lewin eds., 1986).
12. CIO leaders were seemingly unaware of the conditions that threatened African
American workers after World War II. See ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO 1935-1955, at 375
(1995). For an explanation why African-American workers were skeptical of both unions and
management, see AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE OF
THE UAW (1979).
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sound-thinking businessmen today recognize the right of labor to
collective bargaining. Unions are an absolute necessity."' 3  But
Rovensky's words masked a division between management's public
pronouncements and its private beliefs. In truth, most American
managers intensely disliked unions. As two experts from MIT said in
1957, "if American management upon retiring for the night, were
assured that by the next morning the unions with which they dealt
would have disappeared, more management people than not would
experience the happiest sleep of their lives.' 4
American managers were shaken by the Great Depression and
demoralized by the rise of mass unions and the New Deal. But, by
the end of the Second World War, they were regaining confidence
and starting to take aggressive steps to contain unionism. The effort
to get the Taft-Hartley Act passed was one example; another was
General Electric. Although GE was often cited as a union-friendly
firm, in the 1950s it began to move its plants from the unionized north
to the nonunion south. It also started to take a more combative
approach toward its unions. Finally, it developed a variety of new
programs for securing the loyalty and commitment of its employees.
Some of these programs were old-fashioned welfare benefits. Others
were based in the behavioral sciences, such as attitude surveys and
employee counseling. In designing these programs, GE looked for
inspiration and ideas from those employers who had modernized
welfare capitalism-companies like Du Pont, Eli Lilly, IBM, Kodak,
Procter & Gamble, Sears, S.C. Johnson, Standard Oil, and Thompson
Products. In this way, modern welfare capitalism spread from a
minority of employers to a much larger group of American
companies.15
In the 1960s and 1970s, social and economic changes helped
modern welfare capitalism to diffuse more rapidly. These changes
included the movement of jobs away from heavy industry and the
growing importance of educated workers. Modern welfare capi-
talism's emphasis on commitment proved well suited to managing
college-educated workers, who were becoming the dominant group in
the labor force. Modern welfare capitalism also meshed neatly with
13. HERMAN E. KROOSS, EXECUTIVE OPINION: WHAT BUSINESS LEADERS SAID AND
THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES 1920s-1960s, at 347 (1970) (quoting John E. Rovensky).
14. Douglass V. Brown & Charles A. Myers, The Changing Industrial Relations Philosophy
of American Management, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 84-99 (1957).
15. See JACOBY, supra note 8, at 220-35.
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the participative principles that were replacing the old scientific-
management approach to work organization. When management
scholars identified in the 1980s a "new" nonunion model of work
organization, it was, in fact, not especially new. It was simply a
variant of modern welfare capitalism.16
Even in the 1960s, at the peak of the postwar boom, welfare
capitalism failed to reach all workers. Some employers-especially,
but not exclusively, in smaller enterprises-were unconcerned with
the niceties of employee commitment and did little to mitigate risks
for their employees. Yet while welfare capitalism was not the
universal mode of employment, it remained the standard for judging
job quality throughout the labor market.
II. THE CRISIS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM?
During the past twenty years, however, modern welfare
capitalism has been experiencing its most critical test since the Great
Depression. Starting in the 1980s, a series of shocks hit the economy.
Heightened competition, rapid technological change, and corporate
mergers have all led to layoffs throughout American industry. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, it was blue-collar industrial workers-
often unionized-who bore the brunt of permanent job loss. Since
the late 1980s, it has been white-collar, educated workers who have
experienced the sharpest increases in permanent job loss. Less
educated workers still have the highest job loss rates, but their rates
have fallen since the early 1980s. Hence, the gap separating the job
loss rates of males with high school educations and males with college
educations narrowed by more than half between the early 1980s and
the mid-1990s. 17 Companies that had never experienced a major
layoff-firms like IBM, Kodak, and Digital Equipment-began to
jettison thousands of white-collar employees.
What is significant about these recent cuts is that they are
occurring during a relatively tight labor market, unlike previous
postwar layoffs that were keyed to the business cycle. Also, recent
downsizing disproportionately affects educated professional and
managerial employees, a group not previously targeted for layoffs.
16. See id. at 254-59.
17. See Lori G. Kletzer, Job Displacement, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 119 tbl.1 (1998). In
manufacturing, job loss rates in the mid-1990s were half the level observed in the early 1980s.
See id.; see also HENRY S. FARBER, THE CHANGING FACE OF JOB LOSS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1981-1993, at 15-17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5596, 1996).
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The layoffs were-and are-a shock to those employees who believed
themselves immune from job loss. Middle-level managers found that
the elimination of their jobs was often the chief goal of industrial
"restructuring." At large diversified companies, a combination of
mergers, new information technology, and work reorganization
reduced the need for headquarters staff. Fully 85% of large
multinational corporations report that they have reorganized their
headquarters since 1990.18 And managers continue to dominate the
downsizing figures. According to the American Management
Association, about half the jobs eliminated in 1998 belonged to
managers and supervisors, up from 32% in 1997.19 Those who survive
downsizing are being offered a different employment contract.
Instead of employment security in exchange for loyalty, organizations
are proffering a "new deal" that provides higher pay in return for
broader skills and a tolerance for change. 20
Meanwhile, there has been an expansion of so-called
nonstandard employment: jobs that are temporary, part-time, or
contractual. The most recent data show that in 1995 approximately
30% of all employees held nonstandard jobs.21 (The self-employed
accounted for 5.5%.)22 There is a stratum of contingent workers-
those on contract-who are well paid. But other contingents are
more likely to be paid a low wage, and are one-sixth as likely to
receive employer-provided health and pension benefits compared
with those in standard full-time jobs.23 In fact, most of the decline in
health insurance coverage since 1979 has been the result of cutbacks
for contingent workers.24 Coverage has also declined for some of
those holding standard jobs, notably less educated males. 25
18. See Conference Board, Recent HQ Reorganizations: Purposes and Outcomes, H.R.
EXECUTIVE R., 1998, at 3.
19. See Valerie Patterson, The "L-Word" Is Back... Or Is It? Layoff Announcements
Accelerate, but Don't Panic Yet, NAT'L Bus. EMPLOYMENT WKLY., Nov. 1-7, 1998, at 13, 16.
20. See PETER HERRIOT & CAROLE PEMBERTON, NEW DEALS: THE REVOLUTION IN
MANAGERIAL CAREERS 19-20 (1995).
21. See ARNE L. KALLEBERG ET AL., NONSTANDARD WORK, SUBSTANDARD JOBS:
FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. 9 tbl.1 (1997).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 30-31 tbls.18-19.
24. See HENRY S. FARBER, JOB CREATION IN THE UNITED STATES: GOOD JOBS OR BAD?
39-41 (Indus. Relations Section, Princeton Univ. Working Paper No. 385, 1997).
25. See HENRY S. FARBER & HELEN LEVY, RECENT TRENDS IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: ARE BAD JOBS GETTING WORSE? 17, 25 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6709, 1998); KALLEBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 30-31
tbls.18-19.
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It is not surprising, then, that today's employees hold negative
views of their employers. In one survey, the share of employees who
said management was generally respected fell by one-seventh
between 1990 and 1997 (from 58% to 50%).6 Other indicators of
employee loyalty also are on a downtrend. Another survey found
that more than half of American employees said they would switch
jobs for a pay increase of 20% or less.27
Accompanying these changes has been a new ethos of market
individualism, especially in places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley
where there is intense competition for skilled workers and a rapidly
changing knowledge base. These workers-predominantly young and
educated-have grown skeptical not only of welfare capitalism but
also of government, unions, and other large institutions. Believing
that they must have a broad range of skills to succeed in today's labor
market, these workers expect to spend no more than brief stints at
any single firm. They ask only that the employer ensure their future
employability by providing learning experiences that can be added to
their resumes. Less concerned with job security than the generations
who were touched by the Great Depression, they see themselves as
masters of their own fates. They resemble nineteenth-century craft
workers, who treasured their autonomy and hedged their labor-
market risk with a diverse set of skills.
These changes have led to a widespread sense that the
institutional structures erected over the course of the last century are
tumbling down. It is hard not to feel that way when no less than the
American Management Association issues a book titled Corporate
Executions: The Ugly Truth About Layoffs-How Corporate Greed Is
Shattering Lives, Companies, and Communities.28  But reports of
welfare capitalism's demise are exaggerated. We are not moving to
an economy made up only of short-term jobs, indifferent employers,
and disloyal employees. Mid- to large-size corporations continue to
pursue employment practices that are sheltered from the momentary
vicissitudes of the market. It would be a vast exaggeration to say that
long-term employment is dead or that all jobs henceforth will be
26. See Aaron Bernstein, We Want You to Stay. Really, Bus. WK., June 22,1998, at 67, 72.
27. See Worker Loyalty Has Declined in Last Year's Workplace: More Than Half Would
Switch Jobs for a Pay Increase of 20% or Less, a New Study Says, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1998, at
D14 (reporting that workforce commitment fell significantly in 1998); Peter Cappelli,
Rethinking Employment, 33 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 563 (1995).
28. ALAN DOWNS, CORPORATE EXECUTIONS: THE UGLY TRUTH ABOUT LAYOFFS-
How CORPORATE GREED IS SHATTERING LIVES, COMPANIES, AND COMMUNITIES (1995).
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casual positions. "No long term" is a hyperbole. "Less long term" is
not as catchy but far more accurate.
It is a human tendency to believe that one lives in an exceptional
era, fundamentally different from earlier periods. Many people
today-including businessmen, academics, and government leaders-
think that information technology is creating a "new economy" and
an accelerating pace of innovation and productivity. But economic
statistics show that productivity growth today actually is slower than it
was during the first two decades after the Second World War. Paul
Krugman, a fellow curmudgeon, points out: "Of course, there is
plenty of change in today's economy, but there's a lot more
underlying stability in the rules of the game than most people
imagine."29
Just as there is a certain amount of hype attached to rhetoric
about the new economy, there is a tendency to exaggerate how much
the labor market has changed in recent years. The big change, as
mentioned, is the fact that companies are laying workers off during a
prosperous period, with layoffs targeted at white-collar employees.
And employees today bear more risk, including a greater risk of
layoff. But there are still plenty of career-type jobs for educated
workers, and employers still indemnify employees against many kinds
of risk. In understanding the paradox of continuity amidst change, it
is important to recall the distinction between stocks (our endowment
of existing jobs) and flows (the jobs being created and destroyed in
the current period). Just as in the distinction between the large
national debt and the smaller annual deficit (or surplus), we
sometimes forget that stocks tend to dwarf net flows. Moreover,
another important fact is that net flows are composed of two
enormous intersecting streams: job "deaths" (through downsizing)
and job "births" (new jobs).30 Despite downsizing, the U.S. economy
has been adept at maintaining a high birth rate of new jobs, the
majority of which eventually will become long-term positions.
29. Joel Kurtzman, An Interview with Paul Krugman, STRATEGY & Bus., Fourth Quarter
1998, at 87, 88. For another skeptical look at the "new economy," see J. Bradford De Long,
What "New" Economy?, WILSON Q., Autumn 1998, at 14.
30. See generally Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, Gross Job Creation, Gross Job
Destruction, and Employment Reallocation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 819, 820, 860-61 (1992).
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A. Stocks and Flows
Take, for example, the data on employee tenure, one indicator
for gauging the prevalence of long-term or career employment.
Tenure is not easy to measure. There are problems in controlling for
the effect of the business cycle and in using cross-sectional as opposed
to panel data. Also, there are biases that arise when individuals
round off their self-estimates of tenure. Nevertheless, recent studies
have consistently found only a slight drop in the overall prevalence of
long-term jobs. In the 1980s there was little change in aggregate job
stability (job retention rates), while in the first half of the 1990s there
was a modest decline in stability, particularly for long-tenure
workers.3
For men aged 35 to 64, the share employed more than ten years
with their current employer fell from 50% in 1979 to 40% in 1996.32
The sharpest tenure declines occurred in managerial and pro-
fessional-technical occupations (although managers had and still have
the highest probability of being in long-term employment
relationships).33 However, during the same period there was an
increase-albeit slight-in the share of those aged 45 to 64 who are
employed in long-term positions in service occupations and
industries.34  Partly for this reason, female tenure has shown a
different pattern: for women aged 35 to 64, the share employed in
long-term positions rose slightly between 1979 and 1996. 31 While the
rise in female tenure is partly due to changes in women's career
patterns (they are less likely to quit for childbearing than in the past),
it is important to remember that employers are responding to
women's growing desire for stable, career-type positions by providing
them with jobs of this kind.
31. See DAVID NEUMARK ET AL., HAS JOB STABILITY DECLINED YET? NEW EVIDENCE
FOR THE 1990'S, at 27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6330, 1997)
(discussing the decline in job stability during both the 1980s and 1990s); Francis X. Diebold et
al., Job Stability in the United States, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 206, 231 (1997) (discussing the decline in
job stability during the 1980s). Has Job Stability Declined Yet? New Evidence for the 1990's was
presented at the Russell Sage Foundation Conference on Job Stability and Job Security in
February 1998.
32. See HENRY S. FARBER, TRENDS IN LONG TERM EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1979-96, at 29 tbl.1 (Indus. Relations Section, Princeton Univ. Working Paper No. 384,
1997).
33. See id. at 30 tbl.2.
34. See id. at 31 tbl.3.
35. See id. at 29 tbll.
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The unadjusted data for the period 1983 to 1998 show similar
trends. For males over twenty-five years old, the percentage who
worked for their current employer for ten years or more fell modestly
from 38% to 33%; for women that age, the percentage increased from
25% to 28%, nearly canceling the drop in male tenure.36 In service
and retail industries, median tenure rose slightly between 1983 and
1998; in manufacturing and transportation industries, median tenure
declined slightly.3 7
If the analysis is limited to large firms, the evidence of job
stability is even more striking. For fifty-one large companies that
were clients of Watson Wyatt, a consulting firm, average tenure
actually increased in the 1990s, as did the percentage of employees
with ten years (and twenty years) of service or more.38 Even in the
firms with shrinking employment, the odds that a worker would be
with the employer five years later were higher than that for the labor
market as a whole. 39
What about data on employee separations (i.e., layoffs,
dismissals, and resignations)? Even if the amount of time people
remain on their jobs has not changed much, it is possible that workers
are experiencing less security. This could be due to higher levels of
involuntary job loss as a cause of separations. And it could be
reflected in lower levels of voluntary mobility. Unfortunately, there
is no consensus on this issue; different data sets tell different stories.
The Displaced Workers Survey focuses on involuntary job loss
(job loss due to plant closings, positions abolished, slack work, and
other forms of layoff).4° The survey shows a slight increase in
involuntary job loss in the 1990s compared to the 1980s, with most of
the increase driven by job loss for "other" reasons, the nature of
which is not clear.41 Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
("PSID") paint a grimmer picture, with a steady weakening for male
workers-but not female workers-of the negative effect of tenure on
the probability of being dismissed-that is, long-tenure male workers
36. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE TENURE IN 1998, REPORT No. 98-
387, at 41 tbl.2 (1998).
37. See id. at tbl.5.
38. See STEVEN G. ALLEN ET AL., HAS JOB SECURITY VANISHED IN LARGE CORPO-
RATIONS? 19 tbl.2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6966, 1999).
39. See id. at 23.
40. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKER DISPLACEMENT DURING THE
LATE 1990S, REPORT NO. 00-223 (2000), for a description of the DWS.
41. See FARBER, supra note 24, at 11-12.
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stood a greater chance of dismissal.4 2 But another panel study, the
Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation
("SIPP"), shows stability from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s in
aggregate layoff and discharge rates.43 The probability of permanent
layoff declined for young (18 to 35) and middle-aged (41 to 55)
workers, while rising sharply for workers in the 56 to 60 age bracket. 44
The SIPP data on voluntary mobility (quits) exhibit little change
since the 1980s, meaning that layoffs are neither inhibiting quits nor
promoting them. 45  Survey data show the same thing: of those
employed over twenty hours per week, there was no change between
1977 and 1997 in the proportion who said they would seek new jobs
with other employers in the coming year.46 Workers, in other words,
are neither more nor less inclined to hop jobs than they were twenty
years ago.
Data on geographic mobility provide corroborating evidence.
People who change their residence often change their jobs, especially
when a move is out of state. Richard Sennett's protagonist, a high-
tech venture capitalist, moved around the country four times in
twelve years, leading Sennett to lament "the fugitive quality of
friendship and local community" caused by new career patterns.47 In
the suburbs where today's employees reside, "no one.., becomes a
long-term witness to another person's life."'48 But is it really the case
that Americans are more mobile now than in the 1950s, the heyday of
the "Organization Man" and the classic bedroom suburb? In fact,
they are not. Cross-state geographic mobility rates actually are
slightly lower in the 1990s than they were in the 1950s, when
communities and workers allegedly were more stable.49
42. See ROBERT G. VALLETTA, DECLINING JOB SECURITY 21 (Econ. Research Dep't,
Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Working Paper, 1997).
43. See CYNTHIA BANSAK & STEVEN RAPHAEL, HAVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN
THE UNITED STATES BECOME LESS STABLE? 13-14, 19-20 (Dep't of Econ., Univ. of Cal. San
Diego Working Paper, 1998).
44. See id. at 24 tbl.2. Note, however, that when one focuses on tenure rather than
separations, older workers do not show larger tenure declines than younger workers. One
explanation could be that older workers who have suffered permanent layoff are more inclined
to leave the labor market. See NEUMARK ET AL., supra note 31, at 26.
45. See BANSAK & RAPHAEL, supra note 43, at 18, 27 tbl.5.
46. See JAMES T. BOND ET AL., FAMILIES AND WORK INSTITUTE, THE 1997 NATIONAL
STUDY OF THE CHANGING WORKFORCE 115 (1998).
47. See SENNETT, supra note 1, at 21.
48. Id.
49. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Geographic Mobility Rates, by Type of
Movement: 1947-1997, at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration.
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In short, the data indicate a very modest decline in aggregate job
stability in the 1990s, with much of the effect concentrated among
long-tenure males in managerial and professional occupations. The
underlying stock of jobs, however, is still heavily comprised of career-
type positions. Indeed, as the population continues to age, it is likely
that job tenure levels will rise across the labor market. Focusing on
net flows over the past fifteen years, we see a drop of one to eight
percentage points in the proportion employed over ten years with the
same employer; 0 focusing on stocks, we see that nearly one-third of
the adult labor force in 1998 was employed in long-term jobs, rising to
one-half for men aged 45 to 64.51 "Long-term employment relation-
ships" says economist Henry Farber, "remain an important feature of
the U.S. labor market. '52
B. Deaths and Births
If one identifies the U.S. companies with the largest absolute net
job losses since 1990, the list contains many familiar names. Near the
top are Sears (down 166,000 since 1990), AT&T (down 155,000), and
IBM (down 113,000).13 Other major losers include General Motors,
General Dynamics, Digital Equipment, Kodak, Mobil, and Xerox.5 4
Job losses at these blue-ribbon companies send a message that
absolute job security no longer exists. Nevertheless, not all jobs are in
peril, nor is modern welfare capitalism a relic of the past. Despite
laying off thousands of workers, many of these companies continue to
offer career employment and, in some instances, have been rehiring
employees almost as quickly as shedding them. AT&T, which took a
major public relations hit three years ago when it announced plans to
eliminate 40,000 jobs, has had a net reduction of 20,000 jobs since
then because of its new hires. 5
50. See FARBER, supra note 32, at 29-31.
51. See BLS, Employee Tenure in 1998, tbl 2.
52. FARBER, supra note 24, at 25.
53. These data were drawn from Compustat listings for U.S.-based companies for the
period 1990 to 1997. Compustat is a computer database containing financial and other records
of publically traded U.S. corporations. Companies whose employment was affected by merger
or liquidation were not included in the sample. For example, MCI and Worldcom merged late
in 1998. See Standard & Poor's Institutional Market Servs., Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT
databases, at http://www.compustat.com/cgi-www/product.cgi?id=db [hereinafter Standard &
Poor's].
54. See Standard & Poor's, supra note 53.
55. See Stuart Silverstein & Davan Maharaj, Company Layoff Projections Often Don't Add
Up Labor, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, at C1.
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Much of this is common knowledge. What is less well known is
the extent to which employment has been reshuffled in recent years,
either within industries (from unprofitable companies to rapidly
growing ones) or between industries (from mature to expanding
sectors). There has been a slew of companies whose headcount grew
steadily in the 1990s. European and other critics of the U.S.
employment "miracle" scoff at this new job creation, arguing that it is
concentrated in sectors offering low-quality jobs.5 6  And, in fact,
several of the companies with the largest absolute employment
growth since 1990 either offer relatively low-quality jobs-such as
Marriott (up 194,000) and McDonald's (up 91,000)-or they are
purveyors of contingent workers, like Kelly Services (up 172,000) and
Robert Half (up 117,000).57
But the gainers also include companies offering stable, career-
type positions. Those situated in expanding sectors tend to be newer
companies that have not yet become household names. For example,
the following companies each created at least 40,000 jobs since 1990:
in financial services, Morgan Stanley and Norwest; in health care,
Genesis Health Ventures and Sun Healthcare; and in entertainment,
Disney and Viacom. 8 Some of the better-quality job gainers come
from the same industries as those on the losers list. Thus, while Sears
shrank, its competitors-like Dayton-Hudson and Home Depot-
added nearly 200,000 jobs.5 9 In the communications industry, AT&T
contracted, but SBC, MCI, Worldcom, and Motorola added many
more jobs than AT&T cut.6° Gains by EDS, Intel, and Seagate
surpassed losses at DEC and IBM, while even some chemical
companies-unlike Kodak-managed to add considerable numbers
of new jobs, including Praxair, Merck, and Eastman Chemical (once a
division of Kodak). 61
These successful companies put enormous effort into trans-
forming new recruits into company men and women, both in the way
they think and the skills that they possess. While the new jobs do not
provide the kind of iron-clad security that some employees, especially
managers, once could expect, these jobs are far from being short-term
56. See Richard B. Freeman, War of the Models: Which Labour Market Institutions for the
21st Century?, LAB. ECON., Mar. 1998, at 1, 9.
57. See Standard & Poor's, supra note 53.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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positions, a point examined in greater detail below. Hence, the new
jobs will boost median tenure levels in years to come. 62
To find a parallel to the labor market of the 1990s, one has to go
back seventy years. During the 1920s, the unemployment rate was
low and new jobs were rapidly being created. But the health of the
aggregate labor market masked some painful shifts. One factor
fostering job displacement in the 1920s was a high rate of investment
in labor-saving plants and equipment, which gave rise to a new
phrase, "technological unemployment. ' '61 Another factor was sectoral
dislocation. Employment was shifting from blue-collar to white-collar
jobs; from manufacturing to services; and, within manufacturing, from
older industries like steel, shoes, cotton textiles, and railroad
equipment to newer industries like electrical goods, chemicals, and
food processing. The rate at which workers left the industry in which
they were employed more than doubled in the 1920s over the rate
that existed between 1899 and 1914.64 During the Great Depression,
however, contraction of these newer industries was less severe and
recovery more rapid than average; ultimately, these industries were
the ones on which the postwar economy was based.65 Finally, the
1920s were a decade of growing, but unevenly distributed, prosperity,
and some economists believed that the decade's disparities in income
and wealth were a contributing factor to the Great Depression. All of
this should sound eerily familiar, absent, one hopes, the stock market
crash and depression that brought the decade to a close.
62. Precisely where a company fits in these classifications is difficult to judge. For example,
Wal-Mart, which created over 500,000 jobs since 1990, has a high proportion of part-time jobs.
But it is listed by Fortune magazine as one of the nation's top 100 employers because it
extensively promotes from within and invests heavily in employee training. See The 100 Best
Companies to Work for in America, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, at http://www.fortune.com/for-
tune/bestcompanies. The top 100 list also includes several of the companies mentioned in the
text, such as Intel and Merck. See id. Another list-the "most admired companies" -includes
Dayton-Hudson and Tyco. See The Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, at http://
www.fortune.com/fortune/mostadmired. Keep in mind that one reason companies no longer
tout explicit no-layoff policies is the spate of dismissal suits in recent years. Plaintiffs sometimes
have won by claiming breach of an implied promise to provide continuous employment. Such
promises were contained in employee handbooks and other personnel policies. See 1 HENRY H.
PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6.14-.15 (4th ed. 1998).
63. JACOBY, supra note 8, at 168.
64. See id. at 167-70.
65. See MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 51 & tbl.2-1 (1987).
20001
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
C. Job Quality
What about the quality of today's new jobs? We can assess job
quality using proxy measures such as real wage growth and full-time
status. One study finds that in the early 1980s there was a slight
deterioration of real wages for new jobs relative to old jobs.66 Since
then, however, relative real wages have been stable.67 While the less
educated suffered sizeable real wage declines, that pattern occurred
in both old and new jobs.68 Moreover, new jobs of the mid-1990s fell
into the overall wage distribution in much the same way as in earlier
years.69 Thus the evidence is not consistent with the claim that the
new jobs being produced by the U.S. economy are predominantly low
wage. Wage inequality is pervasive and not the result of inferior new
jobs.70
Whether a job is permanent or full-time is another dimension of
job quality. Temporary jobs have experienced rapid growth in recent
years, faster than other jobs.7a But while growth has been rapid, it
started from a small base. Currently, less than 2% of the workforce is
employed on a contract basis or works for temporary help agencies.72
One reason for the growth in temporary positions is employer
reluctance to hire probationary employees who might have to be
dismissed if unsatisfactory. With dismissal costs rising, employers
prefer to use temporary help agencies to screen persons suitable for
career-type positions. (Temporary agencies rarely fire unsatisfactory
workers; they simply stop calling them.) That is, the growth in
temporary positions is, at least in part, a complement to, not a
substitute for, standard full-time employment. 7'
As for part-timers, some 13% of the labor force is employed
part-time on a regular basis.74 That figure is higher than in the 1970s,
but not by much. In fact, the share of part-timers currently in the
66. See FARBER, supra note 24, at 24.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 40.
70. See Sanford Jacoby & Pete Goldschmidt, Education, Skill, and Wage Inequality: The
Situation in California, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 88 (accessing job data in California to
determine why wages are unequal).
71. See Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79 (1998).
72. See Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 1997, NEWS
(BLS, U.S. Dep't of Labor), Dec. 2, 1997, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Employment Arrangements].
73. See DAVID H. AUTOR, WHY DO TEMPORARY HELP FIRMS PROVIDE FREE GENERAL
SKILLS TRAINING? 8, 37-38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7637, 2000).
74. See KALLEBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 9 tbl.1.
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labor force is only one percentage point greater than in 1973. 71
Moreover, for the period since 1980, there is no evidence that new
jobs are more likely to be part-time than old jobs. Finally, bear in
mind that around 80% of part-timers are in those positions
voluntarily-they are not seeking full-time jobs-and some have a
significant stake in the companies for which they work.76
Growth of contingent jobs has leveled off recently. As a share of
the labor force, contingent employment actually declined slightly
since 1995.17 One explanation for this is the recent tightening of labor
markets. For those whose contingent employment is involuntary-as
is the case for many temporary workers-such jobs are viewed as an
inferior alternative to regular full-time positions. With the labor
market heating up since the mid-1990s, fewer workers are finding
themselves having to take these transitional jobs. To put this another
way, labor shortages are forcing employers to assume greater risk
when filling standard positions.78
D. Cyclical Factors
Labor markets are affected not only by structural, secular
changes but also by cyclical factors, such as the unemployment rate.
Cyclical and secular components were difficult to disentangle when
labor markets were stagnant, as was the case for most of the period
since the mid-1970s. But the recent drop in unemployment has
revealed the limits of a purely structural perspective. Unemployment
rates are lower now than at any time since 1973, when the monetary
authorities became obsessed with fighting inflation. In the future, we
may well look back at the downsizing of the 1980s and 1990s and see
more clearly its relationship to cyclical factors.
Low unemployment has two effects. Directly, it fosters the
internalization of labor markets as employers seek to retain scarce
labor. Indirectly, as economist Michal Kalecki first observed fifty
75. For current data, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Employment
Situation News Release, at tbl.A-4, at http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t04.htm. For 1973
data, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 1975-REFERENCE EDITION 74 tbl.21 (1975).
76. See Lester, supra note 71, at 80. For an overview of this issue, see Lewis M. Segal &
Daniel G. Sullivan, The Growth of Temporary Services Work, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1997, at
117.
77. See Employment Arrangements, supra note 72, at 1.
78. See HENRY S. FARBER, ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS AS A
RESPONSE TO JOB LOSS 43 (Indus. Relations Section, Princeton Univ. Working Paper No. 391,
1997).
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years ago, low unemployment enhances the bargaining power of
employees and their ability to get employers to shoulder risks for
them.79 When labor markets are slack, power is on the employer's
side; workers are sedulous and meek. When unemployment rates are
low, the tables are turned; employers are more inclined to accom-
modate worker demands. Indeed, it is revealing that Kalecki pub-
lished his essay during the Second World War, a time when labor was
scarce and unions were strong.
During the hundred-year span from 1870 to 1970, career
employment practices did not grow steadily. Rather, they widened
and deepened most rapidly in periods when unemployment was
relatively low, such as the late 1880s, early 1900s, and the four major
wars of this century.80 Conversely, there were reversions to more
market-oriented employment relationships during slack periods like
the 1890s and 1930s. What happened from the late 1970s through the
early 1990s, then, was the confluence of relatively slow growth, a
loose labor market, and structural shocks arising from deregulation,
globalization, and sectoral shifts. Historical evidence suggests that
any tightening of U.S. labor markets will-both directly (to retain
scarce labor) and indirectly (via bargaining power) - shift
employment practices back in the direction of insulation from market
forces. We can call this the Kalecki effect.81
Presently we again are witnessing the Kalecki effect, as
unemployment plummets. Tight labor markets force employers to
shed labor more carefully and make it easier for workers to find new
jobs. That is one reason why there has been so little outcry over
recent layoffs. Over two-thirds of workers permanently displaced
from full-time jobs between 1995 and 1997 have found reemployment
in full-time jobs.82 An additional 15% are working part-time or at
home, and 15% left the labor market.83 The total reemployment rate
has risen since the mid-1990s, while wage prospects have improved.
Workers who were laid off in the last two years are much less likely to
79. MICHAL KALECKI, Political Aspects of Full Employment, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
DYNAMICS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY 1933-1970, at 138, 138 (1971) (discussing the
political aspects of full employment).
80. See JACOBY, supra note 8, at 145.
81. See id. at 37; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, OUT OF WORK: THE FIRST CENTURY OF
UNEMPLOYMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 48-49 (1986). The idea of a market-organization
continuum is nicely developed in Ronald Dore, Where We Are Now: Musings of an Evolutionist,
3 WORK, EMPLOYMENT & SOC'Y 425 (1989).
82. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Worker Displacement, 1995-97, at
tbl.1, at ftp://146.142.4.23/pub/news.release/History/disp.081998.news.
83. See id.
[Vol. 76:1195
MELTING INTO AIR?
be suffering earnings declines than workers laid off in the early 1990s:
38% experienced earnings declines in the past two years, versus 55%
five years ago.84 However, for some workers-especially the less
educated-job loss was and still is the source of large and persistent
earnings losses.85
Managers and skilled workers are experiencing especially high
reemployment rates. One headhunting agency recently reported that
managers at companies announcing layoff plans often find themselves
with several job offers in hand before the layoffs occur.86 Hence,
while organizations today are somewhat flatter than before, they still
have an enormous appetite for managers, and management remains a
growth occupation. The proportion of managers in the workforce
actually increased over the course of the 1990s, as new employment
growth exceeded the volume lost to downsizing. 87
As companies scramble for help, they are luring new recruits
with offers of traditional career opportunities. As a recent article put
it, "employers are going to great lengths to persuade employees that
they want them to stay for years. ' 88 Employers are dusting off and
reintroducing old-style employee development and training programs
intended to reassure managers and professionals of their prospects.
Citibank, for example, despite recent layoffs, expects its workforce to
grow in coming years.89 Because of this, it recently established a
formal career development program for 10,000 managers. The
company's vice-president for human resources said, "We want to
make people feel that they have a long-term career with us." 9
The response to tighter labor markets suggests a swinging
pendulum. Employers today want careers to be less "boundaryless"
84. See id. tbl.7. Job insecurity has also declined since 1995. See CHARLES F. MANSKI &
JOHN D. STRAUB, WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF JOB INSECURITY IN THE MID-1990S: EVIDENCE
FROM THE SURVEY OF ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 6908, 1999).
85. See LOUIS JACOBSON ET AL., THE COSTS OF WORKER DISLOCATION 1, 3 (1993); Bruce
C. Fallick, A Review of the Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers, 50 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 5, 5, 9 (1996); Gene Koretz, Downsizing's Economic Spin... and Its Impact on
Job-Losers, BUS. WK., Dec. 28, 1998, at 30, 30.
86. I obtained this information while speaking to an executive at Korn/Ferry.
87. See DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF WORKING
AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL "DOWNSIZING" 52, 53 & fig.2.3, 54 & fig.2.4
(1996).
88. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 68.
89. See id. at 68, 70.
90. Id. at 70 (quoting Citibank Human Resources Senior Vice-President Marcela Perez De
Alonso); see also Tom Alkire et al., Employers Find That Tight Economy Requires Use of
Creative Recruiting, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 237, Dec. 10, 1998, at C-1.
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and more organization centered. The problem, of course, is that this
runs directly counter to what today's educated young workers think is
the route to career success: regular changing of employers to gain
experience and to signal ambition. Recently, I spoke to the vice-
president for human resources of a Fortune 500 company, who was
lamenting the difficulty of attracting and retaining young managers
and professionals. I reminded him that people in their twenties and
early thirties were simply responding to the mantra they have heard
employers chanting for the last ten years: that everyone should expect
to change jobs regularly, and perhaps even careers, throughout their
working lives. "Yes, we've been our own worst enemy," he said to
me. "And now we've got to put a new message out."
While corporate restructuring continues, companies are trying
harder now than several years ago to minimize layoffs and retain
skilled employees. When the Asian crisis hit Silicon Valley in early
1998, companies responded by cutting hours and reassigning workers.
Raytheon recently cut 2,700 engineers from its defense arm but
offered them jobs elsewhere in the company.91 Throughout tech-
nology industries-and in other parts of the economy-human
resource managers are obsessed with the problem of recruiting and
retaining workers. It is a different world than five years ago.
E. Benefits
What about fringe benefits, a tangible sign of an employer's
commitment to employees? In health insurance, there has been
almost no change since 1979 in the proportion of private-sector
employers offering health benefits. What has changed are the
eligibility rules, which have become more stringent for short-term and
part-time workers, and the take-up rate, which has declined for full-
time, "core" employees due to spousal coverage. Thus, the evidence
suggests that "employers are continuing to make health insurance
available to their core long-term, full-time employees but are
restricting access to health insurance by their peripheral short-term
and part-time employees. '92
91. See Can America's Workforce Grow Old Gainfully?, ECONOMIST, July 25, 1998, at 59,
60 [hereinafter America's Workforce]. Hewlett-Packard offers "excess" employees time to
locate other jobs within or outside the company when it reorganizes. See Martha Groves,
Layoffs Continue, but Some Firms Are Getting Better at Softening the Blow, L.A. TIMES, May
17, 1998, at D5.
92. FARBER & LEVY, supra note 25, at 25. Another reason for the decline in the take-up
rate (the rate at which employees take benefits offered to them) is the recent rapid growth in
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Pension coverage is a different story. In the 1980s, pension
coverage fell sharply for younger, less educated men-the type of
workers who once were employed in unionized manufacturing jobs.93
For mature workers and college graduates, however, the coverage
decline was modest; for women there was a slight increase in
coverage.94 The situation stabilized in the 1990s. Between 1991 and
1997, the proportion of workers in mid- to large-size establishments
who were covered by a retirement plan rose slightly.95 The big
change, however, has been the shift from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution plans, which is discussed below.
Again, it is important to recall the distinction between stocks and
flows. Despite modest shifts in coverage, employers remain key
elements in our health and pension systems. Two-thirds of all
private-sector workers receive employer-provided health insurance,
rising to 76% for those employed in mid- to large-size
establishments.96 As for pensions, 63% of full-time workers and 21%
of regular part-time workers are covered by employer-provided
retirement plans, with coverage rising to 79% in mid- to large-size
establishments.97  Even as some employers are discontinuing
particular programs, others are adopting new ones such as preventive
medical care, day care, and other benefits targeted at employees with
dependents. Recently, a group of twenty-one major corporations
pledged to invest millions of dollars to make child and elder care
tailored benefit plans permitting employees to pick and choose benefits. In 1988, 13% of big
companies gave employees this option; now over half do. See Compensation in America: Unto
Those That Have Shall Be Given, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 91, 91.
93. See David E. Bloom & Richard B. Freeman, Trends in Nonwage Inequality: The Fall in
Private Pension Coverage in the United States, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 539, 539 (1992).
94. See John R. Woods, Pension Coverage Among the Baby Boomers: Initial Findings from
a 1993 Survey, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Fall 1994, at 12, 12, 14; see also William E. Even & David
A. MacPherson, Why Did Male Pension Coverage Decline in the 1980s?, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 439, 443 tbl.1 (1994) (presenting data on the decline of male pension coverage in the
1980s).
95. See Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997, NEWS
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor), Jan. 7, 1999, at 3-4 & 13 tbl.11 [hereinafter
Employee Benefits]. "Rising rates of pension coverage, participation, and vesting during the
period 1987-1991 reversed a four-year decline." Pension Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN
REV., Apr. 1994, at 40, 41-42. If employers, in fact, move radically away from providing
retirement benefits, employees would likely respond by saving at much higher rates. But as is
well known, despite the recrudescence of ideological market individualism, the U.S. private
savings rate has steadily trended down since the early 1980s.
96. See FARBER & LEVY, supra note 25, at 29 tbl.1, 30 tbl.2; Employee Benefits, supra note
95, at 9 tbl.5.
97. See KALLEBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 31 tbl.19; Employee Benefits, supra note 95,
at 13 tbl.11.
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more available.98 The companies included such paragons of modern
welfare capitalism as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Mobil, and Texas
Instruments.99
F. Wage Policies
Another way of assessing where an employer sits on the
continuum between market- and organization-oriented policies is to
examine the extent to which actual pay rates diverge from market
rates. Companies that insulate employment relationships from
market forces will be more likely to engage in wage-smoothing over
the course of a long-term employment relationship; at any point in
time, wages will be less sensitive to market conditions than in spot
markets. Such companies also are more likely to pay a wage
premium that deviates from market averages. There could be any
number of reasons for this policy, such as turnover minimization
(workers are less likely to quit high-pay employers) or productivity
enhancement (workers are more diligent when the cost of
termination-here, a fall back to market rates-is high).
There is one recent study that finds that wages have become
more sensitive to unemployment rates, although the study uses
industry data and is limited to manufacturing industries adversely
affected by foreign competition in the 1980s. On the other hand,
another recent study uses a unique data set covering white- and blue-
collar occupations in over two hundred large firms over the last forty
years.1°° It finds no evidence of a decline in the magnitude or
persistence of employer wage premiums for individual occupations
and groups of occupations. 1°1 This suggests a high degree of stability
to the extent which employers base their long-term wage strategies on
organizational rather than market considerations.
98. See Women's Bureau: Twenty-One Companies Pledge to Invest $100 Million for
Dependent Care, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 192, Oct. 4, 1995, at A-5.
99. See id.
100. See MARIANNE BERTRAND, FROM THE INVISIBLE HANDSHAKE TO THE INVISIBLE
HAND? How IMPORT COMPETITION CHANGES THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6900, 1999); ERICA L. GROSHEN & DAVID I.
LEVINE, THE RISE AND DECLINE (?) OF U.S. INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 1 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y. Research Paper No. 9819, 1998).
101. See id. at 31.
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G. Training
A proxy measure of employer commitment to incumbent
employees is the extent to which employers make human capital
investments through training and education programs. Unfor-
tunately, the data on formal employer-provided training are not
highly reliable. Be that as it may, employee surveys show that, during
the 1980s, the duration of employer-provided training declined, but
the incidence of training intended to improve workers' skills
increased. 10 2 Employer surveys show training expenditures increasing
at most companies in the 1980s and 1990s; only a minority were
cutting expenditures.0 3
Conversely, there is evidence that individuals today are more
likely to pursue training on their own. Participation in adult edu-
cation activities rose significantly between 1991 and 1995 (from 32%
to 40% of adults), with about half of these being work-related
courses.104 The likelihood of enrolling in such courses rose with
educational attainment, with the highest enrollment rates among
college-educated workers.05 This is the strongest evidence in support
of the notion that workers are assuming more responsibility for
managing their careers, but the data should be used with caution.
Sixty percent of those enrolled in work-related courses were taking
them from business and professional associations, where tuition is
often paid for by the employer. 1°6 Thus, the data also are consistent
with the interpretation that employers are outsourcing employee
training, not doing less of it.
III. EXPLAINING THE PARADOX
To summarize, a variety of sources have been examined to assess
the degree of change in career-type employment practices. Without
doubt, blue-collar workers in the early 1980s and white-collar workers
in the early 1990s experienced higher levels of permanent job loss.
As a result, aggregate job tenure rates have declined modestly since
102 See JILL M. CONSTANTINE & DAVID NEUMARK, TRAINING AND THE GROWTH OF
WAGE INEQUALITY 10-11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4729, 1994).
103. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 131 (1997) (discussing job training
programs and practices).
104. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 1996, at 66 (1996).
105. See id.
106. See id.
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the late 1970s. On the other hand, the majority of workers continue
to hold career-type jobs that offer fringe benefits, training, and
prospects of continuity. For women and those in service occupations
and industries, long-tenure employment has become more prevalent
over the last twenty years. And the economy is creating new jobs that
are predominantly neither low wage nor part-time. Hence the
majority of displaced workers are finding reemployment in career-
type positions. The recent decline in unemployment rates has
boosted prospects for displaced workers and strengthened employer
reliance on career-type practices.
Taken as a whole, the evidence does not show a radical slide to
the market pole of the organizational-market continuum. Organiza-
tional considerations still trump market logic for the bulk of the
economy's jobs, and the majority of employers continue to shoulder
income and employment risks for employees. How, then, does one
explain the disparity between the perception of "no long term" and
the fact that stability remains widespread in the labor market? There
is no simple answer to this question, but explanatory elements can be
found in the sociology of norms and the politics of punditry.
A. Perceptions, Norms, and Power
A stream of research in cognitive psychology documents the
pervasiveness of loss aversion: people weigh losses-like layoffs-
more heavily than gains. 1°c The job losses of the past ten years have
weighed heavily on the nation's middle classes because they involve
the educated-professionals and managers-people like us, people
with whom we can identify. The downsizings and plant closures of
the early 1980s did not generate nearly the same amount of angst or
media coverage even though the displacement rate then was higher
than in the 1990s. 10 8
Recent job cuts also rankled the middle class because they were
widely perceived as unfair: the violation of an implicit contract to
provide security until senior management's own jobs were in peril,
that is, until the company was close to closure. One former IBM
employee said, "In January I was told my job was the safest in the
107. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge
and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL'Y 227 (1976).
108. See Kletzer, supra note 17, at 119 tbl.1.
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nation .... In February we were told half the jobs would be gone." 109
Fueling the sense of unfairness was the belief that layoffs resulted not
from a search for efficiency but from a greed driven change in
corporate governance that favored owners over employees. Repeat-
edly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were reports of profitable
companies laying workers off and then enjoying stock price increases
that benefited senior management and other major shareholders, like
that involving General Dynamics or the more egregious case of Al
Dunlap, former CEO of Sunbeam.10
While employers claim that they must downsize to become
globally efficient, people remain skeptical that business necessity is
the main reason for downsizing. In late 1995, a New York Times poll
found blame for job loss being apportioned almost equally between
business corporations and foreign competition.' The public believes
that a more turbulent competitive environment is only partly
responsible for the rise in layoffs; the other part is normative. In
other words, holding economic conditions constant, people think that
employers today are less inhibited to make job cuts than in the past.
They see downsizing not only as an economic issue but also as a
moral issue: a weakening of the norm that says that ethical employers
engage in layoffs only as a last resort.112
Various explanations have been offered for the norm shift:
(1) the fading legacy of the Great Depression, the severity of which
created a strong preference for stability among the generations
affected-directly or indirectly-by the 1930s; (2) the weakening of
109. ANTHONY SAMPSON, COMPANY MAN: THE RISE AND FALL OF CORPORATE LIFE 225
(1995) (quoting Mary-Francis Mitchell, an IBM marketing services employee).
110. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Editorial, "Chainsaw Al" Gets His Due Business: There Is a
High Road and a Low Road to Sharing Corporate Risks with Employees, L.A. TIMES, June 18,
1998, at B9. Note, however, that the evidence does not support the popular belief that
downsizing boosts stock prices and CEO pay. After controlling for factors like firm size, the
effect of layoffs on CEO pay is nil, and there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff
announcements, although this negative reaction is smaller than in the 1970s. But when
downsizing is combined with asset restructuring, there is a positive effect on stock returns. See
HENRY S. FARBER & KEVIN F. HALLOCK, HAVE EMPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS BECOME GOOD
NEWS FOR SHAREHOLDERS? 20-21 (Indus. Relations Section, Princeton Univ. Working Paper
No. 417, 1999); Wayne F. Cascio et al., Financial Consequences of Employment-Change
Decisions in Major U.S. Corporations, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1175, 1175-76 (1997); Kevin F.
Hallock, Layoffs, Top Executive Pay, and Firm Performance, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 711, 711-12,
720 (1998).
111. N.Y. TIMES, THE DOWNSIZING OF AMERICA 310 nos.69c-d (1996).
112. See, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS
AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT 240 (1998). For an extensive review of the evidence on
labor-market norms, one that finds little change in employee norms since the 1970s, see DAVID
I. LEVINE ET AL., UPJOHN INSTITUTE, CHANGES IN CAREERS AND WAGE STRUCTURES AT
LARGE AMERICAN EMPLOYERS (forthcoming 2001).
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organized labor, which played an important historical role in fostering
internal labor markets; and (3) a generalized unwillingness to carry
burdens for others due to the decline of social solidarity (the so-called
"bowling alone" phenomenon) and the celebration of self-interest
that started in the 1980s and registered its cinematic climax in the
person of Gordon Gekko."13 Journalists reinforce the perception of
employer betrayal by dubbing ours a "Judas Economy," one whose
corporate culture dictates that "anything is acceptable as long as it is
legal and makes money." 114
But it does not logically follow that the consequence of
normative change is the annihilation of career employment. Only if
past employer behavior was driven entirely by norms, and only if
norms are now thoroughly debilitated, would this be the case. But
neither condition holds. First, although a sociological perspective
contributes greatly to our understanding of labor markets and other
economic phenomena, career employment practices are sustained not
only by norms but also by economic incentives-everything from
turnover costs to motivation to customer retention-and those
incentives retain their organizational logic even in today's more
turbulent business environment. I will return to this point.'15
Second, normative elements continue to infuse the employment
relationship. Today's labor market is far from the textbook world of
the anomic spot market. Employment contracting remains recurring
and nonstandardized, hence embedded in a "vast array of norms." 116
Labor exchange is relational, not neoclassical. Employers today
retain a sensitivity to norms-whether they are transmitted by current
and prospective employees, by laws like the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, by the tenets of
professional human resource management, by labor unions, or even
by their own consciences.
Finally, a good deal of what has been identified as a normative
shift is better understood as a change in the balance of power
113. See Jacoby, supra note 7; Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social
Capital and Public Life, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 35.
114. DOWNS, supra note 28, at 26; WILLIAM WOLMAN & ANNE COLAMOSCA, THE JUDAS
ECONOMY: THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITAL AND THE BETRAYAL OF WORK 1-9 (1997).
115. For a guide to the field, see THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Neil Smelser
& Richard Swedberg eds., 1994).
116. Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 901 (1978). Even
downsizing occurs within a set of legal and social norms. See Alfred W. Blumrosen et al.,
Downsizing-Employee Rights or Employer Prerogative?, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
1, 92-93 (1998).
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between managers, owners, and employees. As recent scholarship
shows, our institutions of corporate governance-even our con-
ception of the corporation-were not forged in the crucible of
economic efficiency but in the field of power politics.117 A politically
favorable environment in the 1980s permitted changes in governance
that gave greater weight to shareholder interests than to the interests
of employees and other stakeholders."" The balance of power
presently appears to favor owners, but the situation is mutable. It can
change in response to the "higgling of the market" and to nonmarket
mechanisms like political and union action, or the threat of them." 9
In fact, it is changing. For example, as happened last June, the press
reported that "business is rediscovering the value of corporate
loyalty." 120 This shows that we are observing a shift in bargaining
power-the Kalecki effect-not a secular change in norms.
Fueling the sense of unfairness is a belief that companies are
targeting long-tenure workers for layoff. The perception may be
accurate. Some, but not all, recent studies provide evidence
consistent with the view that permanent separation rates have risen
for long-tenure workers over fifty-five years old.' 21 During the Great
Depression, employers followed a policy of targeting older workers
for layoff, believing that those over forty years old were slow and
ineffectual. 22 Smoldering resentment over these layoffs helped fuel
union demands for strict seniority rules.123
But now, unlike the 1930s, many white-collar employees slated
for layoff depart their companies on a voluntary basis. That is
because there is a trend-which started before the current wave of
downsizing- toward shorter careers and earlier retirements. In the
United States, labor force participation rates for males aged 55 to 64
117. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE, at vii (1994); WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL:
THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 6 (1997).
118. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (1995); MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE
DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 1 (1993).
119. See SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 12 (photo. reprint 1965)
(1897).
120. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 67.
121. Compare BANSAK & RAPHAEL, supra note 43, at 23 tbl.1, 24 tbl.2, 25 tbl.3, 26 tbl.4, 27
tbl.5, 28 tbl.6, 29 tbl.7, 30 app.tbl.1, 31 app.tbl.2, 32 app.tbl.3, 33 app.tbl.4, with FARBER, supra
note 32, at 20-24. Another study finds that the burden of downsizing has fallen most heavily on
junior and senior employees in large firms, with mid-career employees unaffected. See ALLEN
ET AL., supra note 38, at 22.
122. See JACOBY, supra note 8, at 219.
123. See id. at 244.
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dropped from 80% in 1970 to 65% in 1990, a trend also observed in
advanced countries like Germany and Japan where there has been
relatively little downsizing. 24 None of this is to deny that there are
thousands of older workers who have been devastated by job loss and
forced into premature retirement. However, other older workers
have not been displeased when offered early retirement, especially
when accompanied by golden handshakes. 125
B. Discontinuity Fallacy
Another reason for the discrepancy between the rhetoric and
reality of change in employment relations is what might be called,
following historian David Hackett Fischer, the fallacy of discon-
tinuity-an erroneous belief that the present is fundamentally
different from the periods that preceded it.126 Not only fashion
designers but also journalists, management consultants, and
academics build their careers around this conceit. Consultants are
particularly prone to a faddish way of thinking, since it helps to
generate sales of new systems premised on the assumption that the
world has changed so drastically as to render worthless existing ways
of doing business. 127 Academics have similar proclivities. Enthusiasts
for change dramatically pronounce "the demise.., of organizational
careers" and their replacement by something radically different: the
"boundaryless career. 1 28
124. See Ronald Dore et al., Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD
REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 102, 116 (1999).
125. See SENNETT, supra note 1, at 92. At the University of California in the early 1990s,
when the state was experiencing a fiscal crisis, senior faculty were consecutively offered three
early retirement plans as part of an effort to reduce costs. Although ordinarily university faculty
enjoy relatively high job satisfaction, nearly 50% of eligible faculty at the University of
California took early retirement during the first two rounds of the program. In the third round,
over a third retired. (Some had turned down the first two rounds, while others were newly
eligible faculty.) Other data indicate that, for individuals over 55, 15% of those in career jobs
(over ten years) experienced a layoff, while the rate of early retirement with financial incentive
was 47%. See Seongsu Kim, Early Retirement Incentives in a Restructuring Organization: The
Case of University Professors (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA) (on file with the
UCLA Library); see also Peter Cappelli, Rethinking the Nature of Work: A Look at the Research
Evidence, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., July/Aug. 1997, at 50 (discussing changes in
employer-employee relationships and situations that human resources personnel will confront).
126. See generally DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC
OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970).
127. See FREDERICK G. HILMER & LEX DONALDSON, MANAGEMENT REDEEMED:
DEBUNKING THE FADS THAT UNDERMINE CORPORATION PERFORMANCE, at xii-xiii (1996).
128. Michael B. Arthur & Denise M. Rousseau, Introduction: The Boundaryless Career As a
New Employment Principle, in THE BOUNDARYLESS CAREER: A NEW EMPLOYMENT
PRINCIPLE FOR A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ERA 3, 5 (Michael B. Arthur & Denise M. Rousseau
eds., 1996).
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The media, in particular, seized upon the layoffs of the early
1990s as evidence that the American workplace had become, as the
New York Times put it, "new and unnerving.' 1 29 The Times's 1996
multi-part series and subsequent book, The Downsizing of America,
took two dozen people more than seven months to produce. 3 " It was
the longest piece of journalism published by the Times since the
Pentagon Papers in 1971.131 Yet, while the series was chock full of
painful personal stories, it was virtually devoid of economic statistics
for gauging the severity, extent, and consequences of layoffs.
Then there is the Challenger, Gray & Christmas data series,
compiled by a Chicago-based company that specializes in outplace-
ment services. They tabulate corporate announcements of intended,
not actual, layoffs. Since the series began in the early 1990s, the
media has regularly reported Challenger's monthly reports. But the
number of workers actually laid off is often much lower than the job
elimination plans reported in the news releases. Companies
announce the highest cutback totals they can justify to impress
investors by showing them that the companies are getting lean and
mean. But then the companies pursue cuts through mechanisms
other than layoff. Sudden mass departures do occur. But reductions
also are handled through normal turnover, through transfers, through
early retirements, or simply by leaving vacancies unfilled. That is,
because the layoffs take place by mechanisms other than layoff and
the process occurs over a lengthy period, a portion of the announced
layoffs never actually occurs.'32
IV. RISK SHIFTING: PRACTICES AND PROSPECTS
None of this is intended to deny the fact that there has been a
rise in job loss, especially for those employees thought to be most
immune to it. While the direct effect has been overstated, the indirect
effect surely has been to expose incumbent employees to a greater
risk of job loss. And employers have in other respects been shifting
more of the risk burden onto employees. That is the logic of
managed-care plans and larger deductibles for health insurance, both
of which have grown steadily since 1991.133 It is also the rationale
129. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 111, at 37.
130. See John Cassidy, All Worked Up: Is Downsizing Really News or Is It Business As
Usual?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 22, 1996, at 51, 52.
131. See id.
132. See Patterson, supra note 19, at 13; Silverstein & Maharaj, supra note 55.
133. See Employee Benefits, supra note 95, at 10 tbl.7.
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behind the change from defined-benefit pension plans to defined-
contribution pension plans. Furthermore, employers are incorpo-
rating more variability into pay packages via discretionary bonuses,
group incentives, profit-sharing, and stock options. In economists'
parlance, pay is "at risk.'13 4
The reallocation of risk-not the decline of career-type jobs-is,
I would argue, the central dynamic driving today's internal labor
markets. Employers are still protecting employees from the hazards
of unemployment, sickness, and old age. But companies today
operate in a turbulent environment of heightened competition,
mergers, and rapid technological change. It is a riskier world, and
employers are less willing to shoulder as much risk for employees as
they did in the past. 35
Some employees are adapting to this risk-especially younger,
more educated workers with "hot" skills-while others are having a
tough time with it. These workers still look to their employers as the
first line of defense. As that line is pushed back, they question the
fairness of today's risk-sharing arrangements. While most of these
workers are not about to lose their jobs, they are left feeling more
insecure. Forty-five percent of employees in 1977 thought it was not
at all likely they would lose their jobs, but the figure has fallen to 30%
today.3 6 Every layoff announcement affects the perceived probability
of job loss and causes survivors to work harder and worry more.137
Thus, layoffs can have ripple effects far beyond those immediately
affected. 138
134. In mid- to large-sized establishments, the proportion of employees with defined-benefit
plans fell from 59% to 50% between 1991 and 1997, and the proportion with defined-
contribution plans rose from 48% to 57%. See id. at 13 tbl.11. Note, however, some employees
are covered by both types of plans and some of the shifting occurred across, rather than within,
firms due to rapid job growth in smaller, nonunion companies that historically have been
unlikely to offer defined-benefit plans. See generally Ellen Benoit, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish,
6 TREASURY & RISK MGMT. 1, 18-27 (1996); Richard A. Ippolito, Toward Explaining the
Growth of Defined Contribution Plans, 34 INDUS. REL. 1 (1995).
135. The head of human resources at IBM, Gerald Czarnecki, characterized his company's
new approach as a "readjustment which needs a new balancing act." SAMPSON, supra note 109,
at 229. "I never thought it was good for a corporation to take over the role of the family unit,
which is more dependable for society," stated Czarnecki. "Now the pendulum will swing back,
to give a larger role to the family. But there's still a role for all three-family, business and
government . I. " d. (quoting Czarnecki).
136. See generally BOND ET AL., supra note 46, at 76-79.
137. See, e.g., DELORESE AMBROSE, HEALING THE DOWNSIZED ORGANIZATION (1996).
138. Efficiency wage models relate the probability of job loss to employee effort levels.
These models are a microeconomic version of the Kalecki effect. See VALLETTA, supra note 42,
at 1-3; see also Daniel Aaronson & Daniel G. Sullivan, The Decline of Job Security in the 1990s:
Displacement, Anxiety, and Their Effect on Wage Growth, ECON. PERSP., First Quarter 1998, at
17, 18-19.
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Survey data show that workers today feel that their jobs offer
more autonomy but are substantially more demanding-in terms of
effort and workload-than twenty years ago. 3 9 Such insecurity can
also breed sabotage and workplace violence, so-called "work rage,"
which is increasingly of concern to employers.140 The only good news
here is that insecurity is affected not only by local events but also by
the aggregate unemployment rate, and, as compared to five years ago,
fewer workers currently report feeling nervous or stressed.4 1
Does this mean, then, that eventually we can expect to see the
risk burden completely shift to employees, such that employers will
no longer offer fringe benefits, career jobs, fixed salaries, and so on?
The short answer is no. Assuming that current trends will continue
without limit is a reductio ad absurdum, just as it would have been
equally absurd to predict in the 1880s that all jobs would become
career positions carrying generous fringe benefits. There are
economic, demographic, and political limits to the risk reallocation
process. These limits ensure that the corporation likely will remain a
central risk-bearing institution in American society.
One such limit has to do with the organizational realities of
managing a workforce. For most employers, the net economic
benefits of welfare capitalism remain positive. Employee loyalty and
commitment still matter, especially in the burgeoning service sector
where it is often difficult to directly supervise employees. 142  New
workers have to be trained, which makes employee turnover costly.
And employee skills are, if anything, more important today than in
the past, especially in service industries and in fast-changing situations
where little is codified and knowledge is tacit. New systems of work
organization-such as self-managed teams-are less prevalent than is
commonly supposed, but nevertheless they have grown markedly in
recent years.'43 These systems are accompanied by higher levels of
training and tend to be associated with career-type jobs, since job
stability preserves the interpersonal relationships that make teams
effective. Hence, to the extent these systems continue to proliferate,
they create employer incentives to stabilize employment.144
139. See BOND ET AL., supra note 46, at 125.
140. See Mary Curtius, Sure, Workers Get Mad, but More Getting Even: Sabotage Is on the
Rise As Job Security Wanes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1998, at C1.
141. See BOND ET AL., supra note 46, at 48.
142. See STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG ET AL., NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY:
EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 22 (1998).
143. See PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY 99 (1999).
144. "Finding and training a replacement typically costs about 55% of a departing
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For these reasons, companies like 3M, Intel, and Motorola
have-despite layoffs-preserved career-type jobs, albeit lacking
guarantees of permanence. There is plenty of evidence that the
practices associated with career job policies-such as training, profit
sharing, and participatory work systems-are positively related to
corporate performance.145 Other companies that have downsized in
recent years are discovering that outsourcing and temporary
employees-while cheaper in the short run-do not provide the levels
of service and quality that are necessary for customer satisfaction.146
A recent study of companies that have implemented "employability"
contracts-offering learning experiences in return for heightened
employee responsibilities-concludes that the most successful
employers are those who retain "a sense of responsibility to protect
the jobs of their people. 1 47
Some argue that companies in dynamic sectors like Silicon
Valley, Hollywood, and Wall Street operate according to a different,
more market-oriented logic. 1 48 Here, workers tend to be relatively
young and educated, and can move easily from job to job. Employers
do not penalize such mobility because it helps them to keep abreast of
competitors and stay on the cutting edge. In Silicon Valley, for
example, there is pervasive interfirm mobility. Workers are well paid,
and can afford their own health benefits and 401(k) plans. 149 But
these workers are an atypical elite, just as footloose craft workers
were an atypical but essential elite in American industry seventy
employee's annual salary." Can America's Workforce Grow Old Gainfully?, ECONOMIST, July
25, 1998, at 59, 60. For establishments with over 50 employees, 30% use self-directed work
teams, with a coverage rate (percent of employees affected) of around 12%. See Christopher
Erickson & Sanford Jacoby, Training and Work Organization Practices of Private Employers in
California, CAL. POL'Y SEMINAR REP. (1998); see also Maury Gittleman et al., "Flexible"
Workplace Practices: Evidence from a Nationally Representative Survey, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 99, 99 (1998) (estimating the extent to which establishments have adopted six alternative
work organization practices).
145. See U.S. DEP'T LAB., REPORT ON HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE, July 26, 1993, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. NO. 143, July 28, 1993, at F1-F12.
146. See DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: How BUSINESS AND
EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 41 (1995); JEFFREY PFEFFER, THE HUMAN EOUATION:
BUILDING PROFITS BY PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 173-74 (1998). For a study on how human
resource practices and legal liability rules affect the job safety of contract workers in the
petrochemical industry, see James B. Rebitzer, Job Safety and Contract Workers in the
Petrochemical Industry, 34 INDUS. REL. 40, 41 (1995).
147. SUMANTRA GHOSHAL & CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLET, THE INDIVIDUALIZED
CORPORATION: A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT 286-87 (1997).
148. See, e.g., Candace Jones, Careers in Project Networks: The Case of the Film Industry, in
THE BOUNDARYLESS CAREER, supra note 128, at 58.
149. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 50 (1994).
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years ago. Most workers do not have skills that are either as scarce or
as critical to business performance as the technologists in Silicon
Valley.10
Also, the employers of this elite are dissimilar in important
respects from the bulk of the companies that comprise our economy.
Today, most U.S. companies are service providers whose success
depends less on technological breakthroughs than on customer
attraction and retention. One key to customer loyalty is employee
loyalty: experienced and satisfied employees are much better at
finding and keeping customers than fresh recruits. In industries like
financial services, the fastest-growing occupations are those that
require interpersonal skills, which, unlike accounting positions, are
difficult to replace with computerized information systems. These
interpersonal skills are relatively less important in high-technology
industries that are mistakenly touted as exemplars of the future. 5'
And even high-technology companies are beginning to recognize
that rapid turnover and short employment stints can be detrimental.
Take, for example, SAS Institute, a software company based in North
Carolina. The company sounds like a throwback to the heyday of
welfare capitalism. It offers a thirty-five hour workweek, on-site
subsidized Montessori day care, a lavish exercise facility, and
subsidized cafes with live piano music.'52 To make sure employees are
healthy, the company maintains its own medical facility with five
nurse practitioners, two family practice doctors, a massage therapist,
and a mental health nurse.'53  To retain potentially mobile
knowledgeable workers, it tries to accommodate people's changing
careers within the company, not by losing them to competitors. 15 4
150. In fact, most of the employment growth in California is concentrated in jobs that do not
require a college education. During the economic boom of 1991 to 1997, real incomes for the
poorest 20% of all households in the Silicon Valley region fell by 8%. See David Friedman, The
Dark Side of the High-Tech Religion, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at M-1; Jacoby & Goldschmidt,
supra note 70, at 90.
151. For a similar argument by the head of Bain & Company, see generally FREDERICK F.
REICHHELD, THE LOYALTY EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND GROWTH, PROFITS, AND
LASTING VALUE 114 (1996). Although he does not comment on it, Reichheld's case studies
come from service industries that are the sectors of the U.S. economy experiencing the highest
levels of employment growth: financial services, retail sales, insurance, and eating
establishments. See generally FRANCES FREI ET AL., PERFORMANCE IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL
SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr. Working Paper No. 95-03, 1995) (on file
with author).
152. See Martha Groves, In Tight Job Market, Software Firm Develops Programs to Keep
Employees, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at D-5.
153. See id.
154. See id.
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(Turnover at SAS is less than 4% annually, contrasted with the 17%
or more that is common among companies in the software
industry.)155 The company's vice-president of human resources said,
"At 6 P.M., 95% of our assets walk out the door. We have to have an
environment that makes them want to walk back in the door the next
morning."' 156 Past history suggests that as some companies accelerate
the internalization process, others will follow suit as a defensive
necessity.157
A second limit to the risk reallocation process is demographic.
Many workers laid off during the past decade came from the
relatively small pre-1945 generation that preceded the baby boomers.
At one bank, for example, the director said "the machineguns started
firing on day one [after a recent merger], with anyone over 50 in the
front rank.' 15 8 Because older workers are paid more, they are
targeted for layoff and are likely to experience subsequent earnings
declines; younger displaced workers recently have been experiencing
gains in their median weekly earnings. 1 9 Employer animus toward
older workers reveals an important fact: despite all the talk about
delayering, corporations remain pyramidal organizations in which
seniority and pay are positively related; hence you can cut labor costs
by targeting senior workers for layoff.1 60
It was feasible to conduct layoffs in the late 1980s and early 1990s
because replacement workers from the baby boom generation were
plentiful. But the cohort behind the boomers-Generation X-is
relatively small. Current estimates are that the number of 35- to 44-
year-olds will decline by 15% between 2000 and 2015.161 There is little
in sight to relieve the demographic pressure on employers. The long-
term rise in female labor force participation is leveling off, while
white-collar productivity gains are flat. 62 In short, employer concerns
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id.; Overworked and Overpaid: The American Manager, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999,
at 55, 56.
158. America's Workforce, supra note 91, at 59.
159. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 82, at tbl.2.
160. A study of managerial downsizing in British companies reaches similar conclusions. It
found "no evidence of the kind of the transformational change associated with the introduction
of a new model. Instead, [the study found] that the traditional model of managerial
employment has been eroded rather than replaced." Patrick McGovern et al., The Managerial
Career After Downsizing: Case Studies from the "Leading Edge," 12 WORK EMP. & Soc'Y 457,
457 (1998).
161. See Elizabeth G. Chambers et al., The War for Talent, MCKINSEY Q., Spring 1998, at
44, 47 & exh.1.
162. See id. at 47.
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with labor scarcity and retention are likely to persist into the next
century, putting a brake on future risk shifting.
Finally, there are political limits to the amount of risk shifting
that American employers can or would want to pursue. Currently,
the United States has lower unionization rates than any other
advanced industrial country. Our government spends less on social
insurance per worker than other advanced industrial countries.
Corporate managers know-or may discover-that if they let welfare
capitalism wither, there will be public pressure for government and
perhaps even for unions to fill the gap.
The only aspect of risk shifting that knows no limits is a belief in
its inevitability, a habit of mind that Albert 0. Hirschman associates
with the "rhetoric of futility."' 63 The futility argument proceeds by
identifying deep forces-economic logic or human nature-that
cannot be altered. Attempts to change these forces are hopeless and
will perversely result in the reassertion of those forces. In economics,
the doctrine of rational expectations-that activist fiscal policy is
useless in permanently lowering the unemployment rate-is one such
example. A similar rhetoric infuses assertions that market
individualism has triumphed in the economy. Even when shown to be
empirically implausible, those claims nevertheless have real conse-
quences. They encourage the belief that alternative institutions are
destined for extinction. Hence, to retain those institutions-whether
welfare capitalism or the welfare state-is an exercise in futility.
Better to hasten the future by dismantling bureaucracies, dissociating
from organizations, and taking care of "numero uno" - after all, no
one else can or will.
But as Hirschman points out, futility is often proclaimed
prematurely; it is a form of wishful thinking. Similarly, it is wishful
thinking to believe that market individualism is rampant and that we
are living in a world of tenuous associations and arms-length
relationships, the system idealized by nineteenth-century contract
law.164 In fact, we still inhabit a society where markets-including
labor markets-coexist and coevolve with organizations, regulations,
norms, and other institutions. Economic historian Karl Polanyi was
the first to identify this "double movement" of two great organizing
principles: the expansion of the market and the simultaneous
163. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY 43-80 (1991).
164. See generally MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 160-210 (1977).
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expansion of market regulation. 165 If one studies closely the economic
deregulation that has occurred in various sectors over the last twenty
years, what one finds is not a move to pure laissez faire but instead a
redefinition of government responsibilities, a process that one
political scientist calls "reregulation.' 166 As for social regulation, keep
in mind that the Reagan administration had little luck in rolling back
either Social Security or environmental and consumer protection. 167
In fact, the volume of such regulation has steadily grown in the 1990s,
in the labor market and elsewhere. This suggests a simple conclusion:
While we cannot change the level of risk in today's economy, we can
change the rules that govern how risk is shared among the
participants in the economic game.
For example, the SEC could require companies to include on
their financial statements how much they have invested in their
employees. That would be a first step to getting managers and
investors to accurately recognize the value of a firm's human capital.
Second, we can reform our labor laws. Even employers admit that
union-organizing laws have become heavily biased in their favor.
Third, we can change the incentives faced by investors. Today,
institutional investors own two-thirds of the total equity in the stock
market. Institutional investors are fickle creatures who move their
capital around with breathtaking rapidity. Pension funds should pay
capital gains taxes on the stock they churn around, while mutual
funds should do more to penalize short-term traders for the costs that
they incur.
CONCLUSION
The labor market is in flux, but it would be a mistake to project
the future out of recent trends. Career jobs are less expansive, but
they have not melted into air. While people are unhappy with the
risk they are being asked to shoulder, they still look to employers to
share much of the burden. According to pollsters, today's middle-
class Americans think that corporations "should balance their self-
interest with the need to consider what benefits the larger society." 168
Those who ask that corporations be responsible are not asking for
165. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 132 (1944).
166. See STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 3 (1996).
167. See DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS
IN AMERICA 276-79 (1989).
168. WOLFE, supra note 112, at 237.
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anything outside the welfare capitalist framework established by
corporations themselves. There remains widespread support for the
notion that corporations are-or should be-the keystone of
economic security in American society. That is the path we have
been on for the last one hundred years, and we remain on that
trajectory.
The risk shifting experienced by workers in the economy's core is
a serious problem. However, we must not let it overshadow the more
critical situation facing less educated and less skilled workers. Those
workers are steadily falling behind as a result of technological change
and globalization as well as factors specific to the United States such
as high immigration, weak minimum-wage laws, and the decline of
unionism. Since 1980, earnings inequality has grown more rapidly in
the United States than other advanced countries. Low-wage U.S.
workers are both relatively and absolutely poorer than their
European or Japanese counterparts. 169
The problem of inequality ought not to be confused with the
rising risk of job loss. While it is true that less educated workers are
more likely than educated workers to experience a permanent
reduction in earnings when they lose their jobs, this has not been
shown to be a major cause of overall earnings inequality. 170 It could
be that incumbent workers are inhibited from making wage demands
for fear of job loss. But, if this were the case, we should expect to see
the slowest wage growth for educated, white-collar workers, who
have experienced the sharpest increases in permanent job loss in the
1990s. 171 In fact, the opposite has occurred: relative wages of
educated workers have risen and inequality has widened.172 Finally,
169. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1998-99, at
366-67 & tbl.8.9, 368-69 & fig.8B, tbl.8.10, 370-73 & tbl.8.11, figs.8C, 8D (1999).
170. Comparing the cohort of young workers who entered the labor market in the late 1960s
to those who entered in the early 1980s, one study found that the returns to tenure have fallen
for those holding jobs less than eighteen months, but these returns have increased for those
holding jobs for nineteen months or more (hardly a sign of collapsing internal labor markets). If
the probability of holding a long-term job is related to education, then rising wage returns on
those jobs could be a source of inequality. However, the data (see below) do not support the
notion that less educated workers increasingly are being frozen out of long-term positions. See
Annette Bernhardt et al., Inequality and Mobility: Trends in Wage Growth for Young Adults
(1998) (unpublished paper) (on file with Pennsylvania State University); see generally DAVID R.
HOWELL, INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE AND THE AMERICAN WORKER: THE COLLAPSE OF LOW-
SKILL WAGES (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. Pub. Pol'y Brief No. 29, 1997).
171. See Kletzer, supra note 17, at 119 tbl.1.
172. See SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTTSCHALK, AMERICA UNEQUAL 1 (1995);
Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin M. Murphy, Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and
Demand Factors, 107 Q.J. ECON. 35, 35 (1992).
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when one examines the stock of continuing jobs, long-term
employment relationships (over twenty years) are as prevalent for
those with twelve or fewer years of education as they are for those
with baccalaureate and advanced degrees. 173
Thus, the primary cause of inequality is not downsizing or job-
loss risk but rather rising returns to education accompanied by the
collapse of wage-setting institutions in the low-wage labor market.
Educated, middle-class workers are entitled to a better deal, but their
predicament-and our own anxieties -should not overshadow the
plight of low-wage workers. Moreover, it is an exaggeration to say
that career jobs are melting into air. In fact, those jobs have proved
remarkably resilient in the face of economic change, although career
workers today are more exposed to risk than was true thirty years
ago.
173. Cutting the tenure data at over ten years, rather than over twenty years, does give
college graduates an edge over high school dropouts in the percentage holding long-term jobs.
However, this advantage also existed twenty years ago, before wage inequality had grown wide.
Similarly, four-year job retention rates fell in the 1980s for high school dropouts and high school
graduates relative to college graduates, but ten-year retention rates for college graduates
showed a slight decrease relative to the less educated. See FARBER, supra note 17, at 24;
Diebold et al., supra note 31, at 223.
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